Shortly after midnight on March 24,1989, the Exxon® Valdez supertanker ran aground on Bligh Reef, rupturing its hull and spilling eleven million gallons of crude oil into Alaska's Prince William Sound. The spill was the worst that had occurred up to that point in American history, damaging more than 1,300 miles of shoreline, disrupting the lives and livelihoods of people in the region and killing hundreds of thousands of birds and marine animals. However, not only was this catastrophe called “the worst environmental disaster in U. S. history;” but the ensuing public relations response was, correspondingly, a disaster onto itself.
Those Exxon representatives responsible for the welfare of the company’s image failed on so many fronts, that their actions could indeed be documented and published in a non-fiction book entitled How NOT to Produce Successful Public Relations. The failures occurred at so many levels, however, the primary blunders occurred in the following areas: (1) the public relations practitioners (PRP) for Exxon did not self-monitor their organization sufficiently or they could have avoided the incident; (2) they did not assign a single spokesperson for interacting with the media once the crisis occurred; (3) their crisis management tactics were inept and inappropriate and (4) their image restoration approach was unsuccessful. The combination of all these malfunctions resulted in a public relations fiasco.
The results of the National Traffic and Safety Board (NTSB) state that on the evening of March 23, 1989, the captain of the Valdez, Joseph J. Hazelwood, was witnessed by many as having consumed several alcoholic drinks in the town near the Aleyska Pilpeline Terminal. After arriving on the ship and seeing it safely escorted to deep water by a pilot ship, he left the bridge for his quarters, a violation of maritime proceedings. Before leaving, he placed the vessel on automatic pilot incorporating an increase in speed incrementally. He also instructed newly promoted Third Mate, Gregory Cousins, to disengage the autopilot at a certain point, and make certain course changes. An officer alone on the deck below the rank of First Mate was another violation. Consequently, Cousins failed to make the correct adjustments and the ship grounded itself upon an ice spar.
The initiating factor for the debacle was the captain’s consumption of alcohol, causing him to withdraw to his quarters to “sleep it off.” There is significant documentation to show that pre-existing conditions, known by Exxon personnel, were in place that contributed to the incident. The Valdez captain, Hazelwood, had a history of alcohol abuse. His driving license had been suspended or revoked three times since 1984. In fact, at the time of the spill, Hazelwood’s driving privileges were suspended by the state of New York for a 1983 arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). A matter of public record, this should have been addressed by Exxon’s compliance officer and human resource department. An obvious circumstance of risk for the company, yet administrators at Exxon allowed him to proceed in his highly responsible position as captain of a tanker carrying 53 million gallons of oil.
One aspect of public relations is strategic positioning, planning ahead to create a sound corporate structure, and anticipating and managing any risk factors. Well, here was a blatant risk factor that went ignored by Exxon, who suffered tremendously because of that shortsightedness.
The investigation following the spill also uncovered the fact that a complementary radar system was and had been down for more than three months. Exxon neglected to repair or replace the system, thus handicapping the vessel’s navigating ability. Why was the organization so disorganized? Why did the PR practitioners not do their homework in ascertaining whether or not Exxon required strengthening in its structural cohesiveness? This fell under their purview as it affected the strength, and therefore the image, of the company. If they had investigated, they would have found that irresponsibility was a standard trait in the oil industry. A recent Washington Post article exposed this consistent shortcoming of the industry. “A commission that investigated the Alaska spill found that oil companies cut corners to maximize profits. Systems intended to prevent disaster failed, and no backups were in place. Regulators were too close to the oil industry and approved woefully inadequate accident response and cleanup plans” (Stephens, 2010, p. A1). There should have been proactive monitoring in place to locate any vulnerabilities throughout the organization.
In an analysis of the Valdez disaster, Professor Ronald D. Smith of the Communication Department of Buffalo State College made the observation that once the disaster occurred Exxon erred in its initial failure to “designate a single spokesperson and communicate openly” (2007). In essence, they broke two of the cardinal rules of crisis management. In Public Relations Today: Managing Competition and Conflict, the authors declare that two important directives for successful crisis management include, “Designate a single spokesperson” and “Provide a constant flow of information ... When information is withheld, the cover-up becomes the story” (Cameron, Wilcox, Reber & Shin, 2008, p. 50).
Exxon failed to recognize basic tenets of public relations. As perception is the key element in all public and media relations, they produced that of a disorganized and unprofessional entity that seemed intent on deception. Failure to be forthcoming with information produced in the general public an impression of duplicity. In dealing with the crisis, Exxon was beginning in the “minus column.” It was not showing a united front by providing a “face” for the organization, and it was not assuming responsibility by being proactive in the dissemination of information.
When a crisis occurs, the organization must provide a single representative to which the public can relate. Humans require a human face to represent a large and vague entity like a corporation; this is how we process. Additionally, that representative must reach out immediately with information to the public. This shows the public that the representative, and by extension, the organization, cares about them. As the Public Relations Today authors elaborate, “A crisis situation ... puts a great deal of pressure on organizations to respond with complete and accurate information as quickly as possible. How an organization responds in the first 24 hours, experts say, often determine whether the situation remains an ‘incident’ or becomes a full-blown crisis” (2008, p. 49). CEO Rawl did not travel to the spill site until April 14th, three weeks after the incident.
In a New York Times article, writer John Holusha confirmed Exxon’s failure. “The biggest mistake was that Exxon's chairman, Lawrence G. Rawl, sent a succession of lower-ranking executives to Alaska to deal with the spill instead of going there himself and taking control of the situation in a forceful, highly visible way” (1989, p. D1). This is where image restoration can begin. The organization must own up to the problem and exhibit a strong concern for the public and a genuine desire to make restitution. This also goes to source credibility. If the top member of the organization expresses a sincere regret and pledges to remedy the situation to the best of his/her and the organization’s ability, it goes a long way toward providing the public with the possibility for forgiveness.
This goes back to the concept of perception. The organization must be perceived as a noble and ethical one that chooses to do the right thing. It exhibits all the classical romantic notions of Right. It proves that it is an entity deserving of the public’s trust.
Discerning the publics involved is also an important thing. In this fiasco, Exxon had many publics to which to direct messages for healing. It needed to send an overall message to the general public that it cared for them and would do right by them. It also, however, had to demonstrate to the media that it wanted to deal fairly and openly in a reciprocal fashion with them as well. Exxon had to convince the media that it would be open, responsible and professional with them. Exxon failed here as well as it formed a media blackout for the first week! This was an incredibly blatant blunder! Further, it often produced press releases with conflicting messages, from various sources. Compounding this was the fact that when organized information was being disseminated, it was done from the remote town of Valdez, Alaska (for which, of course, the tanker had been named). This remote area was difficult for many media organizations to travel to, and had limited communications facilities; thus creating a hostile, rather than a welcoming media atmosphere.
Another public with whom Exxon needed to concern itself was the United States Government. It continued to deny culpability in the matter, and was slow in providing the NTSB with information to help determine what exactly had transpired. It actively attempted to muddy the waters (pardon the pun) regarding who was ultimately responsible. According to a U.S. News & World Report article, “Exxon, for instance, devised a corporate ‘Public Affairs Plan: 1990 Decision’ that advised how to approach key Bush administration officers ... [Interior Secretary Manuel] Lujan, for example, was proving troublesome with claims that Exxon's massive 1989 cleanup was incomplete” (Playing the PR Game – Spin Patrol, 1993).
Finally gaining momentum in the public relations arena, and trying to salvage its reputation, Exxon continued to make poor decisions. Once Exxon finally assumed a somewhat proactive role in the providing of information, it failed yet again in its choice of crisis resolution tactics. It assumed an initial stance of deniability of responsibility, a big mistake. In attempting to restore its image, it produced the opposite effect. According to Cameron et al, resolving a crisis can be achieved by choosing among various options along the contingency continuum (p. 41). The extremes of the continuum are advocacy and accommodation; to take a strong stance and deny guilt or, conversely, accept culpability, assume a remorseful stance and dedicate oneself to restitution. Within this continuum are degrees of advocacy/accommodation such as compromise and collaboration. Exxon chose one extreme of the continuum, advocacy, and denied having any responsibility for the unfortunate incident. It blamed the U. S. Coast Guard, the unpredictability of weather and geography and the captain, among other things. It assumed the role of unfortunate victim, and this was a colossal mistake.
Whatever outrage that was directed toward Exxon increased exponentially. Again, it committed a major faux pas in not assuming responsibility for its actions. The image it was producing was that of an immature teenager being caught cheating on an exam, and blaming it on the student from whom he was cheating. These are the kinds of decisions that destroy political futures, and this tact by Exxon has tarnished its reputation even to the present day.
Crisis management consultant Gerald C. Meyers contrasted Exxon CEO, Lawrence Rawl’s approach with that of Mr. John Hall, Ashland Oil's chairperson who handled a disastrous oil spill near a Pennsylvania river. “He was a little slow out of the blocks, but after a day and a half he began to move heaven and earth,” Mr. Meyers said. “He pledged to clean everything up, he visited news bureaus to explain what the company would do, he answered whatever questions were asked. Within 24 hours he had turned the perception from ‘rotten oil company’ to ‘they are pretty good guys.’”(Holusha, p. D1). This is the accommodating approach that Exxon should have adopted. When it realized that the advocacy game was not working, it was already too late.
Exxon has perpetuated its irresponsible approach by vigorously appealing the punitive awards levied against it by the federal courts for its part in the oil spill. Their efforts have paid off. The original judgment of five billion dollars was cut in half in 1994, and in 2008, that amount was reduced down to $500 million (Yost, 2008, para. 1) in a Supreme Court ruling. To be fair, Exxon did pay $900 million in penalties from civil suits. Referring to ongoing hearings, however, a Los Angeles Times writer states, “...still lingers ...So does the resentment, and state hearings on the continued effects ... are reviving the pain and anger of the people affected by the spill. But in sometimes emotional testimony, fishermen, Native American leaders, conservationists and academics said the government should seek additional damages ... ‘What Exxon did to us is not fair. What has been done to us is a travesty,’ Robert Wolfe, a fisherman who lives in Girdwood, said at a hearing Saturday” (2006, April 10, C1). Exxon created for itself a black cloud clinging to its world image.
It should be noted that a contributing factor to Exxon’s pitiful public relations display is that it did not seek outside PR counsel for help until many weeks after the incident. Of course, they should have gotten professional help immediately; that is why they are called professionals. Exxon then could have avoided the prime errors it committed. It would have assigned a single, likable spokesperson to address the issue initially, and throughout the ongoing crisis.
It would have been proactive in sharing information immediately with the media, and would have done so in the appropriate environment – not Valdez, Alaska. It would have sent a clear message that it assumed responsibility for the fiasco, sympathized with all those unfortunates it affected, and planned to make everything right.
It would have then continued creating messages that gave the impression (perception) that this was a company of integrity, worthy of the public’s trust. It would have made it clear that it was dedicated to resolving the entire situation to everyone’s satisfaction insofar as that would be possible.
This is what true, professional public relations is all about and what could have helped salvage some of Exxon’s image. With the correct PR plan, it would have created an aggressive self-monitoring plan and might have avoided the disaster in the first place. It would have realized that public relations is a two-way dialogue, and would have also monitored it’s perception by the various publics. Once the crisis occurred, it would have established a strong strategic plan for resolution, assigning one, credible, likable source for message dissemination. Finally, it would have created a strong, clear plan for the resolution of the crisis and the restoration of the company’s image. This would have been How to Produce Successful Public Relations.
References
Cameron, G. T., Wilcox, D. L., Reber, B. H. & Shin, J-H. (2008). Public relations today: Managing competition and conflict. Boston: Pearson.
Holusha, J. (1989, April 21). Exxon’s public-relations problem. The New York Times. Retrieved October 20, 2010, from Proquest database http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=-960963601& sid=2&Fmt=3&clientId=74379&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Playing the PR game - Spin patrol [Editorial]. (1993, August 30). U. S. News &
World Report. Retrieved October 19, 2010, from http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/ InfoWeb?p_product=AWNB&p_theme=aggregated5&p_action=doc&-p_docid=0ED7CFCF0F71FE5F&p_docnum=10&p_queryname=3
Smith, R. D. (2007). Exxon Valdez oil spill (Public relations report). Abstract
retrieved from Buffalo State College website:
http://faculty.buffalostate.edu/smithrd/PR/Exxon.htm
Stephens, J. (2010, July 14). The Valdez's unheeded lessons; BP was part of Alaska response, but decades later same problems persist. The Washington Post. Retrieved October 16, 2010, from Proquest database http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=2079510871&-sid=3&Fmt=3&clientId=74379&RQT=309&VName=PQD
Years after spill, pain lingers. (2006, April 10). Los Angeles Times, business
desk. Retrieved October 18, 2010, from http://proquest.umi.com/
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Yost, P. (2008, June 25). Court slashes judgment in Exxon Valdez disaster. The Associated Press: Washington, D. C. Retrieved October 22, 2010, from http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D91H64A00&show_article=1
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